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AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHT OF JUDGES AND
JUDICIAL CANDIDATES TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH*
JUSTICE ROBERT F. ORR**
Elected judges and judicial candidates often face a difficult
dilemma - balancing their need to campaign and First Amendment
right to free speech with principles of judicial ethics. It is in this
context that courts have attempted to deal with the issue - and
caused controversy in the process. The Supreme Court of the
United States exacerbated these controversies when it declared
parts of Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct unconstitutional in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. In response to White, the
North Carolina Supreme Court revised its state Code of Judicial
Conduct, generating increased controversy over the proper scope of
2
political conduct by judges and judicial candidates in that state.
The tension between a judicial candidate's First
Amendment rights and the need for judicial independence and
impartiality cannot be easily remedied. In a recent Columbia Law
Review article, author Matthew J. Medina wrote:
'If there is a hierarchy of protected speech,
political speech occupies the top rung' because
'discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government
* Traditionally, a law review article is a scholarly discussion of a
pertinent legal issue; however, since my approach to the topic presented takes
a more practical track, I have entitled it an Essay. Forgive the non-scholarly
approach and lack of esoteric discussions of the law and instead reflect on the
real world dilemma faced by judges and judicial candidates as they balance the
right to free speech against the principles of judicial ethics.
** Associate Justice, North Carolina Supreme Court, 1995-2004.
1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2004).
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established by our Constitution.' 'The free
exchange of ideas provides special vitality to
the process traditionally at the heart of
American constitutional democracy - the
political campaign. In a nation in which
sovereignty is ultimately derived from the
people, 'the ability of the citizenry to make
informed choices among candidates for office is
essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we
follow as a nation.' The First Amendment thus
'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.'
3
This is the crux of the conflict at hand: we want a campaign
for political office to enjoy the "fullest and most urgent
application"4 of the First Amendment, but we do not want judges
and judicial candidates to be "politicians" and campaign for office.
It is a conflict that has been self-created; in her concurring
opinion in White, Justice O'Connor wrote, "[i]f the State has a
problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought
upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."
5
5
Still, the conflict is a reality. Purists and guardians of judicial
independence tell judicial candidates that they cannot cross a
rigidly defined boundary of conduct in the course of their
campaigns. Such a position leads to the simple truth that campaign
by resume and word-of-mouth may not produce a winner who is
best suited for the position. The people put in the middle of this
conflict are, of course, the judges and would-be-judges. For the
incumbent judge seeking to be re-elected and continue his or her
3. Matthew J. Medina, The Constitutionality of the 2003 Revisions to
Canon 3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1072,
1085-86 (2004) (internal footnotes omitted) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.3.6.3, at 1032-33 (2d
ed. 2002), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam), Eu v.
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989), Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982)).
4. Id. at 1086.
5. White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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judicial career, the choice is particularly stark - either win the
election or hang up the robe and search for a new career and means
of supporting yourself and your family.
It is within this context that judges and courts across the
country wrestle with these issues. My goal is to give some insight
into this conflict as it relates to judicial elections in North Carolina
through a historical look at the state judiciary, statutes relating to
judicial conduct, examples of the current conflict, and steps that the
North Carolina Supreme Court and other parties are taking to
resolve it.
JUDICIAL OFFICE IN NORTH CAROLINA:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
From 1776 until 1868, judges in North Carolina were
6
selected by the General Assembly for life appointments. With the
advent of the 1868 Reconstruction constitution, judges were elected
by the people for the first time in North Carolina. By act of the
General Assembly, the elections were partisan.' This trend in
Jacksonian democracy may well have seemed like a progressive
idea to the framers of that constitution, and it put North Carolina in
line with many other states in the union, but not all agreed that it
was a good idea.9 In a prescient report filed in the 1869 - 1870
session of the North Carolina General Assembly, William M.
Robbins, Chairman, submitted the following observation:
[E]lect your judges for short terms, make them
the playthings of the popular breath, and you
drag them down from the pinnacle where
justice sits robed in eternal sunshine, into the
fog of passion and prejudice, if not corruption.
You, in a manner, compel them to be
politicians and therefore partisans, and expose
6. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 113 (1993).
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR
CENTURIES 269-70 (1989).
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them to evil influences without number. Some
will stand firm and remain pure; some will
become corrupt, but all will be suspected.
Those who deserve public confidence, will often
fail to command it; for multitudes will suspect
others of yielding to temptations which
themselves would not resist. And popular
distrust of the judiciary is an evil only less than
a corrupt judiciary itself.'°
Judicial elections produced little in the way of political
fireworks for the first few decades and resulted in, essentially, a
one-party judiciary comprised of Democrats. In the 1890s the so-
called Fusion Coalition emerged, consisting of Populists,
Republicans, and African-American voters.12  This coalition
resulted in the election of Republicans to the Supreme and
Superior Courts. 3 However, with the white supremacy campaign of
1898, and the impeachment and nearly successful removal of two
Republican Supreme Court justices in 1901,15 the short era of two-
party contests for judicial seats came to a temporary end in North
Carolina. 6  Judicial elections essentially became a perfunctory
process except for the occasional Democratic primary, and once
elected, the system operated as a virtual lifetime appointment for
the incumbent Democrat.
7
With the emergence of the Republican Party in North
Carolina in the 1970s, judicial elections began to move away from
their previously gentile nature and became just another political
race. Perhaps the low point in this period was an unsuccessful 1974
10. WILLIAM M. ROBBINS & C.T. MURPHY, N.C. GEN. ASSEM., REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SENATE BILL TO PROVIDE FOR CALLING
A STATE CONVENTION, S. Doc. No. 34, at 7-8 (1869-70 Sess. 1870).
11. See POWELL, supra note 9, at 405-06.
12. Id. at 427-30.
13. Id. at 429.
14. Id. at 435-36.
15. Id. at 445. "[H]ouse representative ... [brought] impeachment
charges for a technical violation of the constitution against the new chief
justice, David M. Furches, and Associate Justice Robert M. Douglas." Id.
16. See id. at 439.
17. See id.
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bid for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by a Republican
candidate who was a fire extinguisher salesman. I' This candidacy
prompted the passage of a state constitutional amendment that
required at least a law license to run for judicial office.' 9 While the
amendment prevented judicial office from being like any other
elected position, the reality remained that all you needed to be
elected - at any level of the state court system - was a law license,
filing fee, and a lucky roll of the election dice.
It was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that the state's one-
party domination began to crumble as Republican candidates began
an inexorable and politically unpredictable march to gaining parity
in the judiciary. After winning a few seats in the late 1980s, two
Republicans won Supreme Court races in 1994 - for the first time in
20the Twentieth Century. Six of the seven current North Carolina
Supreme Court Justices, including the Chief Justice, are
Republicans and all, with the exception of Justice Paul Newby,
were elected on partisan ballots. 21 Republicans also hold seven
1& See Matthew Eisley, Lack of a License a Bar to Bench, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 18, 2004, at B5 ("North Carolina voters
added the requirement to the state's constitution in 1980, after fire-
extinguisher salesman James Newcomb of Williamston ran in 1974 for chief
justice of the state Supreme Court.") [hereinafter Lack of a License].
19. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 22 ("Only persons duly authorized to practice
law in the courts of this State shall be eligible for election or appointment as a
Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the
Superior Court, or Judge of District Court."). The amendment was adopted
through popular vote on November 4, 1980 and became effective January 1,
1981. See also, Matthew Eisley, Non-Lawyer Spars for Spot on the Ballot, THE
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 14, 2004, at B5 (discussing an
attempt by a non-lawyer to gain a place on the ballot in the 2004 judicial
election for the North Carolina Court of Appeals); Lack of a License, supra
note 18.
20. Joseph Neff, Party's Court Win in Doubt, THE NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 20, 1996, at A3 ("Republicans won all eight of the
Superior Court races they entered when the votes were counted statewide.");
see Matthew Eisley, GOP Now Has Deep Bench, THE NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 4, 2001, at Al [hereinafter GOP].
21. The political party registration of North Carolina voters is available
at http://www.sboe.state.nc.us/votersearch/seimsvot.htm. A check of the
current court shows that six of the seven justices are registered Republicans.
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seats on the fifteen-seat Court of Appeals." In addition, a large
number of trial judges are Republicans, although both Superior
Court judges and District Court judges have been running in
nonpartisan elections longer than appellate judges.2' The once
invincible Democrat-dominated judiciary has now reached a
relatively balanced status between the two political parties.
THE NORTH CAROLINA CODE
Prior to 1972, address and impeachment were the only two
procedures available for handling judicial misconduct in North
24Carolina. Since 1868, only two North Carolina judges have been
impeached and, apparently, no judge has ever been subject to
address.25  Many felt that system did not provide feasible
alternatives, or adequate remedies, for those situations in which a
judge's conduct did not rise to a level warranting removal, but was
nonetheless improper."
Many states responded to the need for - and the public's
interest in - a more effective system of policing judicial conduct. In
North Carolina, this was accomplished by creating a judicial
qualifications commission by constitutional amendment . North
Carolina's constitutional amendment states:
(2) Additional method of removal of Judges.
The General Assembly shall prescribe a
procedure, in addition to impeachment and
22. Id.
23. GOP, supra note 20.
24. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17 cl. 1; see also In Re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109,
159-60, 250 S.E.2d 890, 919 (1978) (holding that address is a procedure
whereby a judge may be removed for mental or physical incapacity by joint
resolution of two-thirds of the General Assembly and impeachment is a
procedure whereby the House of Representatives brings charges and the
Senate sits as the court); Edwin Warren Small, Judicial Discipline - The North
Carolina Commission System, 54 N.C. L. REv. 1074, 1075 n.2-3 (1976).
25. See Small, supra note 24, at 1075 n.7.
26. Id. at 1075 (citing AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL
DISABILITY AND REMOVAL COMMISSION, COURTS AND PROCEDURES i
(1972)).
27. Id. at 1075 n.4 ("The amendment changed art. IV, § 17(1), and added
art. IV, § 17(2).").
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address set forth in this section, for the removal
of a Justice or Judge of the General Court of
Justice for mental or physical incapacity
interfering with the performance of his duties
which is, or is likely to become, permanent, and
for the censure and removal of a Justice or
Judge of the General Court of Justice for wilful
misconduct in office, wilful and persistent
failure to perform his duties, habitual
intemperance, conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute."
The General Assembly proposed the amendment and the
voters approved it in the general election on November 7, 1972.29 In
anticipation of the passage of this amendment, the General
Assembly adopted legislation, conditioned upon ratification of the
proposed amendment, establishing the North Carolina Judicial
Standards Commission.0 The Commission was designed to be the
appropriate agency for review of complaints "concerning the
qualifications or conduct of any justice or judge of the General
Court of Justice."3  The function of the Commission was to
investigate complaints against sitting judges and candidates for
judicial office and to recommend to the Supreme Court what, if
32
any, disciplinary action should be taken.
According to state statute, in North Carolina a judge may
be censured or removed for "willful misconduct in office, willful
and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance,
28. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 17 cl. 2.
29. See Act of June 14, 1971, ch. 560, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 488 (providing
procedures for the censure and removal of Justices and Judges of the General
Court of Justice).
30. In Re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 160, 250 S.E.2d 890, 919 (1978); see Act
of June 17, 1971, ch. 590, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 517 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7A-375 to 378 (2003)).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (2003); Edward B. Clark, The
Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina, 4 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1,
19 (1981).
32. In re Renfer, 345 N.C. 632, 632, 482 S.E.2d 540, 540 (1997).
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conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute. 33 Note that the language used in the statute
tracks the language used in the Constitutional amendment. The
Supreme Court has held that this language is not so vague as to be
constitutionally infirm.3
To clarify the language used in the statute, the Supreme
Court adopted specific guidelines for judicial officers and set them
forth in the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.35 The North
Carolina Code was originally based in large part on the language
36used in the ABA's 1972 Model Code. Since the main purpose of
the code was to better define the constitutional and statutory
standards, there is little authority for the proposition that it was
meant to be an enforceable set of guidelines. Instead, the code was
meant to be a resource that guided the Court's and the
commission's interpretation of the statute. 7
It is important to note that the Commission itself can
neither censure nor remove. The Commission aids the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals in determining the fitness of a member
of the judiciary, but it is up to the appropriate court to actuallyS 38
impose sanctions. As a corollary, the only grounds upon which a
judge may be censured or removed are the constitutional and
statutory grounds for such censure or removal.
North Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct was amended in
1974. The Court added more specificity to the reporting
requirement for extra-judicial activity in Canon 6 and edited the
language in Canon 7 to allow judges who were not running for
election to judicial office to endorse particular candidates for
office.3  Canon 7 was again amended in 1976 to allowjudicial . a   i nd i996t lo
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (2003).
34. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 243, 237 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1977) (citing In
re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305-06, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976)).
35. Nowell, 293 N.C. at 243, 237 S.E.2d at 252; see N.C. COURTS COMM'N,
REP. TO THE GEN. ASSEMB. 28 (1971); Small, supra note 24, at 1081.
36. LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE
109 app. c (1992).
37. Nowell, 293 N.C. at 243, 237 S.E.2d at 252.
38. Clark supra note 31, at 19.
39. See Amendment to Code of Judicial Conduct, 286 N.C. 729 (1975).
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candidates for judicial office to endorse another candidate for
judicial office, but adding a provision that prohibited judges from
contributing to candidates for non-judicial office.4° Thereafter, the
code remained unchanged until 1997 when the state Supreme Court
adopted additional amendments, essentially in response to the
possibility that a federal court might declare parts of the code
unconstitutional.4 ' The 1997 amendments removed the "announce"
clause, which prohibited the discussion of legal or political issues,
from Canon 7B(1)(c). 41 It is in this context that the North Carolina
Supreme Court faced the prospect of dealing with the result of
White.
THE IMPACT OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE IN NORTH CAROLINA
The Supreme Court's decision to strike down the so-called
''announce clause" in the Minnesota Canons of Judicial Conduct
led to other federal court cases, including Weaver v. Bonner4' and
Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct." These cases
followed, at least in part, the holding from Minnesota v. White. In
the light of these decisions, the North Carolina Supreme Court
determined to further examine the state's Code.
The potential for challenges to provisions of the North
Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and the increasingly partisan use
of the Code in the context of judicial campaigns concerned the
Court. In this context, in 2002 and 2003, the Court undertook an
exhaustive review of the existing Code, the cases striking down
provisions in similar Codes, and the political realities that judges
were facing by having to run for election. Consistent with prior
practice, the Court did not open the process to public debate or
input, but instead spent more than a year internally reviewing all of
40. See Amendments to Canon 7A Code of Judicial Conduct, 289 N.C.
733 (1976).
41. See Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory
Judgment at 1, Brooks v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 2:96CV00857
(M.D.N.C. 1996).
42. See Order Adopting Amendments to the Code of Judicial Conduct,
346 N.C. 806 (1997).
43. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
44. 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
2004]
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the provisions in the Code. The end result was a comprehensive
revision of the Code and a unanimous, bipartisan vote by the Court
to adopt the changes. In April 2003, the new Code was adopted
and subsequently put in place. 5
With the 2004 election cycle looming, the Court wanted to
get the new provisions out to the judiciary and bar so that any
questions could be resolved quickly. Presentations were made to
the trial judges explaining the changes and the rationale for making
them. Months went by with virtually no complaints or other
responses to the changes. However, in October, several articles
appeared in media publications that generated a degree of criticism
46
from some members of the judiciary, in addition to a few editorials
condemning the changes.47
The primary changes to the Code that sparked this concern
were: (1) judges could no longer be punished for making a direct
solicitation for support; (2) the so-called "pledge or promise" clause
was removed from the Code; and (3) the revised code clarified and
expanded the permissible ways for candidates to attend and
participate in political events and make endorsements in non-
48
judicial elections. Unfortunately, the descriptions of these changes
as reported by the media were neither accurate nor reflective of the
purposes behind the Code changes. 49  The Court responded by
attempting to explain the reasoning behind the changes in an effort
to quell a growing body of misleading information.
As to the first revision allowing direct solicitation for
support by a candidate for judicial office, the Court carefully
45. See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004).
46. See Matthew Eisley, Bench Hopefuls Bank on Personal Beliefs, THE
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2004, at B1. But see David
Ingram, Ethics Rules Reformers Upbeat, WINSTON-SALEM J., Oct. 18, 2004, at
Al.
47. See Matthew Eisley, Judicial Campaigns Take 'Non' Out of
'Nonpartisan' Races, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 26, 2004;
see generally, Steve Ford, When Prosecutors Say, 'My Bad,' THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 2004, at A34.
48. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(B)(1)-(4) (2004).
49. See Matthew Eisley, Not Really Nonpartisan; Candidates for
Judgeships in North Carolina Keep Party Affiliations, Except on the Ballot,
THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 3, 2004, at B8.
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studied and followed the guidelines set out in Weaver v. Bonner.°
In Weaver, the Eleventh Circuit struck down a portion of Georgia
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B) which prohibited direct
solicitation of contributions." The Weaver court determined that
the restriction was unconstitutional since it was not narrowly
tailored and chilled candidates from discussing their need for
support with donors and endorsers.52 In addition, the North
Carolina Supreme Court made the change to remove what the
Court perceived to be the hypocrisy under the prior Code.
Previously, it was permissible for a judicial candidate to ask a
supporter to endorse the candidate publicly, raise money for the
campaign, host or sponsor a fundraiser, or otherwise become
actively engaged in all necessary elements of a campaign. 53 In
addition, the candidate could appear in front of special interest
groups or Political Action Committees (PACs) and directly seek an
endorsement, knowing full well that the endorsement carried with it
a PAC contribution plus the practical benefit of the group's active
support in the way of distributing material supportive of the
candidate. Yet, a judicial candidate could be punished under the
prior Code for asking his or her neighbors to buy a $25 ticket to a
campaign barbeque. Removal of the direct solicitation ban was
seen as complying with First Amendment principles for political
campaigns and eliminating unequal treatment in the methods
judges and judicial candidates used to garner support.54
50. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Canon 7(B) of the
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct was unconstitutional because it chilled core
political speech and did not satisfy the stringent requirements of strict
scrutiny).
51. Id. at 1323.
52. Id. at 1322-23.
53. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 7(A)(4)-(5) (1999).
54. Order Adopting Amendments to the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 7 (Apr. 2 2003), available at
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/aoc/NCJudicialCode.pdf [hereinafter
N.C. Order on Canon 7] (stating that provisions of Canon 7 were, in part,
designed to work in conjunction with the "right of judicial candidates to
engage in constitutionally protected political activity"). It should be noted
that the amended Code in no way encourages a direct solicitation of the
practices previously mentioned; it only concludes that a judicial candidate will
not be punished for it.
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Ultimately, the reaction to the change bordered on the
ridiculous as opponents contended that the Court had allowed
judges to "shake down" the lawyers appearing before them.5 The
Court pointed out in measured responses that the statutory offense
of "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" was
sufficiently clear and expansive to cover any such behavior."
Solicitation of support in any form - whether permissible under the
prior Code or the revised one - has to be determined on a case-by-
case basis; the hypothetical examples of extreme conduct were
neither contemplated as permissible nor realistically supportable.
The specific circumstances surrounding the direct solicitation would
ultimately determine if it was "conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice" and thus punishable.
The second revision of concern dealt with the removal of
the so-called "pledge or promise" clause. Under the previous Code
a judge or judicial candidate could not "make pledges or promises
of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office. 57 As a practical matter,
this clause was drawn so narrowly that one could question whether
it was permissible to promise to support "mom, America and apple
pie." In light of Minnesota v. White and the difficulty in
distinguishing between a candidate's right to "announce" a position
on issues and a candidate's perceived right to make a "pledge or
promise" of something beyond the "faithful and impartial
performance of judicial duties," the Court eliminated the provision
from the Code. 8
Again, the anguished cry of opponents to the change
conjured up horrible scenarios of judges promising to convict all
drivers charged with drinking and driving or stating how they would
rule in advance on a case pending before them. These claims
ignored, as previously noted, the statutory grounds for punishment
for certain acts that could be "prejudicial to the administration of
55. Matthew Eisley, Election Rules Relaxed for Judges, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
13, 2003, at 7.
56. See N.C. Order on Canon 7, supra note 54.
57. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1999).
58. See N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (2004).
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justice."59 Could anyone seriously contend that a judge stating how
he or she would rule in advance of hearing a case should not be
found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice?
The answer is obvious; at a minimum, any judge would have to be
recused from the case if guilty of such imprudent conduct.6°
Finally, opponents lamented the broadening of the Code in
the area of endorsements and participation in political events.
Here, the Court drew upon the realities of campaigning statewide -
often for periods of time stretching over a year. Historically,
judicial races in North Carolina have been substantially under-
funded and generally ignored by the press and public. 61 Thus, out
of necessity, judicial candidates have been forced into the retail
politics of appearing at various political functions and associating
themselves with better known and better financed candidates for
non-judicial office. A judicial candidate's appearance at political
functions and direct or indirect association with other non-judicial
candidates was viewed by the Court as conduct that should not be
punishable. The revised Code took great care to expand the
endorsement process to only judicial candidates and not judges
generally.62 In addition, the Court explicitly defined "endorsement"
so that ambivalent conduct such as being on a platform with other
candidates in a supportive fashion was not deemed an endorsement;
rather, the definition required an express endorsement of that
candidate for office.
While other changes to the Code engendered some
discussion and controversy, the areas discussed above were the
most criticized. From the Court's perspective, the critics failed to
give full meaning to Minnesota v. White and its recognition that
59. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (2004).
60. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCr Canon 3(C) (2004).
61. Part of the reason for voter apathy may have been due to a lack of
available information on the candidates. Fifty-seven percent of voters taking
part in the 2000 North Carolina elections had little to no information about
the judicial candidates, and 43 percent said the primary reason they were not
more interested in judicial elections was because they did not know enough
about the candidates. N.C. Ctr. for Voter Education, Opinion Poll, at
http://www.ncvotered.com/downloadslPDF/poll_052002/memo.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2004) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review).
62. N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(3) (2004).
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judicial candidates have the same First Amendment rights as any
other candidate. Instead, critics seized upon doomsday scenarios
that would not realistically be permitted under the revised Code or
under the actual statutory standards set out as grounds for
discipline.63 Furthermore the Court, heeding Justice O'Connor's
previously noted statement 64, believed that if the state continued to
require judges to be elected, then the practical realities of
campaigning needed to be taken into consideration and judges or
judicial candidates should not be punished for doing what was
necessary to conduct a viable campaign. Whether to full advantage
of the Code changes was a decision left to the individual candidates
- and ultimately the voters, who could reject any conduct that they
found inappropriate by voting against that candidate.
A MOVE TOWARDS CONSENSUS: THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Throughout the discussions that led to Code changes, the
North Carolina Supreme Court considered the creation of a
committee to provide guidance about the ongoing issue of
regulating judicial conduct generally - and in particular political
conduct under Canon 7 of the Code. With the changes to the Code
producing a degree of controversy and concern, the Court
determined that a study of the issue would be useful. Chief Justice
I. Beverly Lake, Jr. subsequently announced the creation of an
Advisory Committee on Permissible Political Conduct for Judges
and Judicial Candidates. The Committee was chaired by two
members of the Supreme Court and included two judges from the
Court of Appeals, eight Superior Court judges, and ten District
Court judges.65 In addition, there were eight licensed attorneys
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (2004).
64. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792, (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
65. N.C. Advisory Committee on Permissible Political Conduct for
Judges and Judicial Candidates roster (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review). The Supreme Court justices were Robert F. Orr and Robert H.
Edmunds, Jr. Court of Appeals judges were Patricia Timmons-Goodson and
Ann Marie Calabria. Superior Court judges were James L. Baker, David S.
Cayer, Howard E. Manning, Jr., Quentin T. Sumner, Allen Cobb, Melzer A.
Morgan, Jr., Marlene Hyatt, and W. Russell Duke. The District Court judges
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including a law professor, former president of the North Carolina
Bar Association, the now vice-president elect of the North Carolina
State Bar, two trial lawyers representing the plaintiff's bar and the
defense bar, a member of the Appellate Defender's office, an
attorney who specializes in First Amendment work for various
press organizations, and a former practicing attorney now working
for a law school.66 There were also three public members including
a theologian, university provost, and a public affairs consultant.67
Finally, there were four members of the General Assembly - two
each from the House and Senate, all of whom were licensed
attorneys.6 The Committee was staffed by Professor Jim Drennan
and Professor Jessie Smith of the Institute of Government at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The Committee was comprised of numerous judges who had
run for judicial office either in district elections or statewide,
representing an almost equal number of registered Democrats and
Republicans. It was geographically balanced and reflected a
diverse composition along racial and gender lines. Initially pilloried
in the press for not being inclusive in addressing the Code issues
initially, the Court hoped that this group would reflect the Court's
interest and concern. Unfortunately, the press virtually ignored the
creation of the Committee and its composition.
Over the course of the following months, the committee met
several times. Meetings consisted of a variety of activities,
including discussion among members, guest speakers from states
who had already addressed the problem, and small group discussion
of specific examples of questionable conduct.69 At the time of the
were Gary S. Cash, Randy Pool, Denise S. Hartsfield, James R. Fullwood,
Regina Rodgers Parker, William A. Leavell, Jane Harper, Jimmy L. Myers,
Wendy M. Enochs, and Lee W. Gavin.
66. Id. Attorney members of the committee were Herman E. Gaskins,
Jr., J. Norfleet Pruden, III, Steven D. Michael, Karen Frasier Alston, J.
Nicholas Ellis, Janet Moore, E. Gregory Wallace, and John A. Bussian.
67. Id. Public members of the committee were Roger Brown, Audrey
Galloway, and Gilbert A. Greggs. Jr.
68. Id. Committee members from the House were Deborah K. Ross and
Timothy Keith Moore. Senate members were Walter H. Dalton and Richard
Yates Stevens.
69. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (discussing some of
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drafting of this essay, Professor Drennan and Justice Edmunds
were preparing a draft report and summary of the Committee's
votes and the impressions generated by the discussions among the
members and the various guest speakers. It is intended that after
the draft report is submitted and reviewed, a final group report will
be issued and the individual members can attach comments or
observations to it. Ultimately, the final report will be submitted to
the Chief Justice and the entire North Carolina Supreme Court for
consideration as to future modification of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
There was also a set of proposals for legislative and
structural changes in the operation of the Judicial Standards
Commission which has not been discussed in this essay. Those
proposed changes submitted by John C. Martin, Chief Judge of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals and Chairman of the state
Judicial Standards Committee, and based upon his discussions with
former members of the Commission and its current Executive
Director Paul Ross will ultimately be considered by the Court, the
General Assembly and the Judicial Standards Commission
members where appropriate.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING AND
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
White and the need for revision of the North Carolina rules, the
Committee considered a variety of scenarios designed to help meet
the need for clarity and fairness in the North Carolina judicial
conduct rules.
The scenarios submitted to the committee dealt with three
general areas of political conduct. The first dealt with the ability of
judges and judicial candidates to attend political events.7° The• . 71
second set of scenarios dealt primarily with fundraising and the
those examples).
70. Scenarios #1: Political Conduct Issues (Tentative Draft) (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review) [hereinafter Scenarios 1].
71. Scenarios #2: Campaign Conduct Issues (Tentative Draft) (on file
with the First Amendment Law Review) [hereinafter Scenarios 2].
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third addressed the candidates' rights of free speech.72 Each of the
scenarios had three participants: an incumbent judge up for
reelection in the immediate election cycle, an attorney who
intended to run against the incumbent judge, and an incumbent
judge who was not up for reelection in the immediate election cycle,
but would be in the following one.7 ' The idea, in part, was to see if
the committee members viewed conduct differently depending on
the status of the three fictional participants.
In the first set of scenarios, the committee reviewed the
types of campaign events that a candidate might want to attend: a
party-sponsored political dinner, a fundraiser for an incumbent
Congressman, a fundraiser for another judicial candidate, and a
74PAC reception. There was also a changing element of timing -
whether or not activities would be permissible before an official
notice of candidacy or after.7"
As a practical matter, candidates running for any office -
particularly statewide office - need to have visibility in the political
community and in the public if they are to be successful in their
election bid. Deciding where to draw the line between acceptable
and forbidden conduct is not an easy task, as the group's discussions
disclosed.
The second set of scenarios implicated fundraising,
including: asking an accountant neighbor to buy a ticket for a
campaign event, asking a former law partner to be Chairperson of
the Election committee, and asking a former law school classmate
(who practices in the court in the election at hand) to be campaign
finance director. 6 Other scenarios have judicial candidates asking
attorneys to sell tickets for or host campaign events. While the
public financing component of the Judicial Reform Act" potentially
mitigates this problem for appellate judges, it does nothing for trial
72. Scenarios #3: Speech Issues (Tentative Draft) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review) [hereinafter Scenarios 3].
73. Scenarios 1, 2 and 3, supra notes 70-72.
74. Scenarios 1, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. Scenarios 2, supra note 71.
77. 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 158, codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.61
to 278.70, 163-278.13, 105-41, 105-159.2, 163-321 to 335 (2003).
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judges who do not have access to public financing.
Another serious solicitation issue is that of appearances in
front of PACs and other special interest groups. Endorsements
from these organizations have played a very large role in judicial
races and will likely have an even greater effect in non-partisan
races. The impact of an endorsement comes from the potential for
a financial contribution - but more importantly, from the ability of
the group to communicate support for the candidate to its
membership. The ethical challenge (and I would say hypocrisy) of
the prior rules was that it was a violation of the Code to ask a
neighbor to buy a ticket to a campaign barbeque, but permissible to
ask a PAC for an endorsement - knowing that the endorsement
carried with it a $2000 check and the efforts of the group in aiding
your election.
The third set of scenarios addressed the candidates' right to
free speech under the First Amendment. The questions included
whether the candidates could state their positions on "hot-button"
issues such as tort reform and same-sex marriage or become
involved in (and seek endorsements of) groups that held strong pro
or con views on a specific subjects. 7
Another important speech issue is whether a candidate can
answer questions about these sorts of issues to media
representatives or PAC endorsement committees. Finally, the
committee looked at the permissibility of a candidate participating
in a professional seminar where the merits of prior decisions would
be discussed.79
Few of the circumstances discussed in these scenarios
resulted in easy answers. It is difficult to balance a candidate's First
Amendment rights and the public's interest in the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary. The committee has made an effort
to weigh these interests carefully and recognize the difference
between conduct which is not desired or recommended and conduct
which should result in the candidate being disciplined.
78. Scenarios 3, supra note 72.
79. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Without prejudging the outcome of the Committee's report
or attempting to speak for its members, a few observations are in
order. First, the Committee members came away from the exercise
realizing that there is no simple answer - particularly in the context
of the balancing act between what judges and judicial candidates
are allowed to do under White, and the First Amendment and the
public and professional interest of maintaining judicial
independence and public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary. Many of the answers to the factual scenarios resulted
spirited debate and split votes among the members. While
recognizing that there was a substantial difference between what a
judge or judicial candidate should do and whether that conduct was
punishable, the Committee members at times struggled with finding
the right answers or reaching a consensus.
On a structural note, virtually all of the non-judges were
astounded that there was no compilation by the Judicial Standards
Commission of advisory opinions or ethics opinions that could
serve to guide judges or judicial candidates in this area.
Historically, as one observer noted, you could ask for an advisory
opinion and get a different answer depending on when you called
and who you spoke with. There appeared to be clear agreement
that a system for judges akin to the State Bar's method of compiling
and publishing Ethics Opinions should be instituted.
As previously noted, the Committee's work arose in part
out of a series of events criticizing the Code changes made by the
North Carolina Supreme Court and predictions of catastrophic
consequences in the upcoming election. As this essay goes to press,
the election has come and gone under the Code. While
controversies arose and complaints were filed with the Judicial
Standards Commission, the changes to the Code do not appear to
have negatively impacted the process. Of particular interest, in a
yet unpublished post-election survey conducted jointly by the North
Carolina Bar Association and the Center for Voter Education the
voters strongly indicated a desire for more information from
judicial candidates, particularly their party affiliation, stand on
issues, and political philosophy.
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While this observation is no guarantee that future elections
will be equally uncontroversial, it is worth noting that so far the
"controversial" Code changes appear to work. There is, and has
been, a statutory framework in place that attempts to guide and
control judicial conduct. The Supreme Court maintains the
ultimate authority to punish judges, and is willing to exercise that
authority. However, the Court - as shown by the changes made to
the Code - is not willing to improperly infringe on the
constitutional rights of candidates for judicial office simply to
appease public or press sentiment. The problem is neither the
Court nor the judicial candidates. The problem that creates these
conflicts is the state constitutional mandate that judges be elected
and the unwillingness of the General Assembly and the public to
change the system. Until that happens we must struggle along this
foggy, pothole-strewn path, teetering on the edge of an ethical
precipice looking for the safe, proper, and constitutionally correct
course.
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